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ATTEMPT TO REGULATE RESTRICTIVE
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN THE FIELD OF
AIR TRANSPORTATION WITHIN A
TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

J.

KODWo BENTIL*

T

HERE ARE VERY few economic activities with an international or transnational dimension which prominently feature the direct exercise of national
governmental powers. Air transportation, however, is
one area of economic activity in which states have emphasized the need for the exercise of their national sovereign
powers. For that reason, effective commercial competition in the air transportation industry may have become
unattainable. It is no exaggeration to state that over the
past sixty years a national-governmental right of intervention in the operations of the air transportation industry
has been recognized under public international law. Indeed, by granting states complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above their respective national
territories, the Paris Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919 appears to have given this right
universally binding legal force.' Later, the Chicago Con* Of the Department of Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia.
I Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, opened for signature
Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173. Article.. states:
The High Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory. For the purpose of the present Convention, the territory of a
State shall be understood as including the national territory, both
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vention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 reinforced that provision of the Paris Convention. 2
Moreover, since the end of the Second World War, scheduled air transport service has been under the special legal
control of individual states.
The result of this individualized control has been the
severe restriction of open commercial competition in the
operations of the air transportation industry. Indeed,
whatever element of commercial competition is to be
found in the international air transportation industry, particularly with respect to travel or carriage across international routes, has, to a large extent, been made possible
by means of bilateral agreements between various national governments. As one commentator has observed,
''open competition is not an available option because of
the legal environment within which air transport services
have to operate." 4 While it cannot be overlooked that the
1948 Bermuda Conference on International Civil Aviation
sought to establish a regime of commercial competition in
the provision of air transport services by different national
operators,5 very little appears to have been accomplished
in that respect. Moreover, one aviation transportation expert has expressed the view that for open commercial
competition to be possible in transnational air transportation, a number of conditions must be met: (1) the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty over territorial
airspace must be overturned; (2) individual states must be
persuaded to relinquish control over routes, rights, fares,
that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial
waters adjacent thereto.
Id. at 190.
2 Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
No. 1591.
See AIR TRANSPORT: A COMMUNITY APPROACH: MEMORANDUM OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, at 24-25 (Bulletin of the European Communities, Supp. May, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Air Transport]. See also Dold, The
Competitive Regime in InternationalAir Transportation, 5 AIR L. 139, 141 (1980);
Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1001,

1003 (1980).
4 Forest, Is Open Competition Preferable to Regulation?, 6 AIR L. 7, 11 (1981).
.1See Dold, supra note 3, at 139.
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and rates; and (3) the system of bilateral agreements must
be6 dismantled and a new legal regime invented to replace
it.
Needless to say, such conditions are viewed as
formidable.7
At an international level, the foregoing conditions may
be difficult or impossible to achieve. However, they seem
possible within the legal and institutional framework of an
integrated, regional grouping of states. Indeed, the European Economic Community (EEC) is in the process of
seeking open, international competition in the field of
transnational air transportation. Toward this goal, the
Commission of the European Communities (EC Commission), has submitted to the Council of European Communities (EC Council) a proposal for the adoption and
promulgation of EEC secondary legislation to apply the
antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty and to regulate
various forms of anticompetitive commercial activities in
the air transportation industry within the EEC. 8
o See Forest, supra note 4, at 8.
7Id.

8 See The EC Commissions's Tenth Report on Competition Policy at 94 (Brussels-Luxembourg Apr. 1981). Under the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC
Treaty], article 189, the EC Council and the EC Commission are, respectively,
empowered to (1) adopt Regulations; and (2) issue Directives or make Decisions,
for the general purpose of effecting the objectives and the programs of the EEC
in establishing the European Common Market. EEC Regulations are of general
application in all the Member States of the EEC and are directly applicable and
legally binding in their entirety. Consequently, they have immediate legal force in
all the Member States of the EEC, without enactment of specific national laws.
EEC Directives also have binding legal force in the Member States of the EEC,
albeit only with respect of the results intended by their implementation. The national authorities of the Member States of the EEC appear to have been left with
some discretion as to the choice of form and methodology by which EEC Directives are to be given effect within the various national territories. Usually, proposals for the adoption of an EEC Directive are made by the EC Commission and
submitted to the EC Council for consideration and adoption into EEC law. While
some proposals of the EC Commission are adopted and promulgated into EEC
law, others are either delayed or not adopted at all. Often, national economic and
political self-interest tends to determine whether or not particular proposals of
the EC Commission are adopted by the EC Council and promulgated into EEC
law. It should be noted that the EC Council is the principal EEC organ responsible for the making of essential policies of the EEC and for the enactment of EEC
secondary legislation in the forms of Regulations and Directives. EEC Decisions,
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Consequently, it is the principal goal of this article to
examine the potential impact upon the commercial operations of the air transportation industry within the EEC of
the EC Commission proposal, should it be adopted and
promulgated by the EC Council into binding EEC law. It
is necessary at the outset, however, to identify some of the
principal types of anti-competitive commercial practices
of air transportation operators. Following that examination, this article will outline some of the essential features
of the antitrust law of the EEC. In conclusion, the final
two sections will serve to place this article into proper
perspective.
I.

SOME IMPORTANT FORMS OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE FIELD OF AIR
TRANSPORTATION

Among the important forms of restrictive commercial

activities which are practiced by airline operators are monopolization or attempts to monopolize, fare-fixing, market allocation or market-sharing, group boycott, and the
operation of tying agreements or arrangements. 9 Moreover, individual national governments tend to operate or
exercise direct control over the operations of the major
airlines in their respective territories. These practices
tend to limit or restrict effective commercial competition
in the air transportation industry. Considerations of national sovereignty and national prestige have motivated
individual national governments to restrict commercial
competition in international or transnational air transpor-

tation. As a leading British weekly news magazine has
observed,

The air above a nation is as sovereign as its soul, penealthough also having binding legal force, tend to be addressed to particular Member States or to individual natural and juridical persons. It has become accepted
practice to refer to EEC Regulations, Directives, and Decisions as constituent
forms of EEC secondary legislation. See The EC Commission's Tenth Report on
Competition Policy, supra this note.
s?Cf Beane, supra note 3, at 1014-15.
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trated only by express permission. Add to that the prestige which many nations attach to their national airlines,
and you have a recipe for permanent protectionism. A
third-world nation will limit competition from efficient airlines because it wants to keep its own national airline aloft.
A nation like Switzerland also turns protectionist, not because Swissair is inefficient but because Swiss labor costs
are too high for Switzerland
to be an economical country
0
to run an airline from.'
There seems to be a general view that a monopolization
within the air transportation industry is a "natural" occurrence."' On the strength of this view, it is sometimes
thought that a monopoly situation in the air transportation industry brings about economies of scale. 2 However, one legal commentator has observed the situation in
the air transportation industry in the United States, stating that "[t]he available evidence clearly indicates that all
of the current trunk and local-service carriers have
reached a size at which scale no longer affects unit
costs." 13 It is indeed questionable whether at the present
state of the development of the air transportation industry
there are real benefits of economies of scale to be derived
from monopolization of or mergers within that industry.
Moreover, the existence of state monopoly or overall control in the air transportation industry could render it difficult or impossible for private enterprise to enter the
international market for scheduled air services and charter flights.
In addition, the power of individual national governments over the determination of air fares and over tarifffixing cannot be overlooked. The EC Commission has
Io See Free Trade in the Sky, 287 THE ECONOMIST, June 4, 1983, at 14.
1 See, e.g., White, Economies of Scale and the Question of 'Natural Monopoly' in the
Airline Industry, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 545 (1979). In other words, monopoly or
monopolization in the air transportation industry tends to come about as a result
of structural and economic factors and circumstances which are, by and large,
unavoidable. The upshot is that the air transportation industry then comes to be
dominated by a few large airline companies. Id.
1

Id.

1-iId. at 573.
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pointed out that "[g]overnments usually have the final say
in setting fares for scheduled air services following negotiations between companies as expressly laid down in government agreements."' 4 In other words, while individual
airlines may appear to have complete freedom to determine what fares to charge for the provision of air transportation services, in reality they merely carry out the
instructions of their national governments.' 5 This is the
case even though the setting of fares for scheduled international air transportation services is negotiated and
agreed upon by individual national governments within
the general legal framework of the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). Consequently, the fixing
of individual air fares has tended to make political, rather
than economic, sense. In most circumstances, national
economic protectionism tends to be a dominant motive.
Consequently, taxpayers and airline passengers are made
to bear the cost of economic inefficiency. As The Economist magazine has observed, "[p]rotectionism then fosters higher costs, which have to be met by passengers or
taxpayers or both. Some passengers are priced out of
traveling, which means the airlines price themselves into
overcapacity. This is further promoted by airlines which
offer frequency
of service as a convenience to
6
passengers."'
National governments often impose restrictions upon
the operations of foreign airlines or carriers which enter
or leave their territorial airspace. In this context, foreign
airlines or air carriers may be required to comply with var14 See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
22. See also Dold, supra note 3,at 141, where reference is made to the anomalous
situation by which the "actions of the scheduled international airline industry are
both highly regulated and interdependent." Id.
5 Cf
EC Commissions's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
23.
- See Free Trade in the Sky, supra note 10, at 14. The observation apparently was
prompted by the antagonism of various Atlantic-route-operating airlines towards
People Express Airlines for its undertaking to fly passengers cheaply across the
Atlantic. Id.
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ious nation-specific procedures and standards.1 7 In addition, restrictions may take the form of user charges on
foreign airlines, without the same charges being levied on
domestic airlines."8 Understandably, this has generated
disagreements between states' 9 despite existing bilateral
agreements between some states. The Member States of
the EEC, among others, have been parties to such disagreements. As the EC Commission has pointed out,
[e]ach State carries out a protectionist policy for its national air carriers, aimed to preserve its political prerogatives and to profit itself from its advantages. These may be
its geographical location, the importance and composition
of its national market and its special relations with this or
that part of the world.20
Arguably, only the establishment of a transnational antitrust legal regime, under which the operations of individual airlines could be kept under proper scrutiny, would
ensure more effective commercial competition in the air
transportation industry.2 ' The achievement of this end
may require the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. Unfortunately, the conclusion of such
an international convention is unlikely to be forthcoming.2 2 Thus, this is still greater rationale for the EC Commission's attempt to pursuade the EC Council to adopt
and promulgate EEC secondary legislation for the antitrust regulation of various restrictive commercial practices
17 Beane, supra note 3, at 1021-22.
It is contended that standards and procedures governing route entry and exit may also be anti-competitive. Id.
18 See, e.g., Dold, supra note 3, at 139, where reference is made to the claim of
United States airlines that "foreign authorities enforce grossly unfair user charges
which cannot be economically justified and discriminate in favor of their own national carriers." Id.

it, Id. at 141. See also Bin Cheng, The Right to Fly, 42 THE GROTIUS SOCIErv 99

(1957).
20

See Air Transport, supra note 3, at 27.

See, e.g., Dold, supra note 3, at 155, where the idea of "full multilateralism,"
as suggested by states such as Canada at the Chicago Conference of 1944 for
ensuring effective competition in the international air transportation industry, is
supported. Moreover, it has been suggested that such an approach might be instituted on a regional basis. Id.
22 Cf Dold, supra note 3, at 154-55.
21
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in the air transportation industry.2 3
II.

BASIC FEATURES OF THE ANTITRUST LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE EEC

There are two main features of EEC antitrust law and
practice which need to be outlined. One feature relates to
the substantive elements of the antitrust law of the EEC,
while the other concerns the essential procedural aspects
of the law. It is convenient to examine each of the two
main features separately.
A.

Essential Substantive Antitrust Law of the EEC
The essential substantive provisions of EEC antitrust
law are contained in articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty. 24 These articles are elaborated upon by the jurisprudence of the EC Commission and supplemented by
the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (EC Court). The general principle governing the legal system of the EEC, the primacy of EEC
law over the respective national laws of the individual
Member States of the EEC,2' 5 applies with equal force in
the field of antitrust regulation. The EC Court has had
occasion to emphasize this principle in its preliminary ruling in the leading case of Walt Wilhelm and Others v.
2
It cannot be overlooked that, before submitting its proposal to the EC Council for adoption and promulgation of EEC secondary legislation, the EC Commission was confronted with the case of Sterling Airways in which a Danish private
airline operator sought to challenge the exercise of the monopoly power of the
state-controlled Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). However, the EC Commission felt that it had no power of its own to investigate and impose penalties in
those circumstances. See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy,
supra note 8, at 94.
24 EEC Treaty among Belgium, The Federal Repubic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, signed in Rome on Mar. 27, 1957, effective Jan.
I, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 3; [1972] Cmnd. 4864.
2
This means that in any situation where the application or the enforcement of
a national law or measure of a Member State of the EEC tends to conflict with a
given EEC law or measure, the latter shall prevail. Consequently, national laws or
measures of individual Member States of the EEC which happen to be incompatible with a given EEC law become invalid under the legal system of the EEC. This
could be said to constitute the essence of the establishment and the operation of
the European Common Market system.
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Budekaterllamt.26 The individual Member States of the
EEC are required to ensure that their respective national
antitrust laws are applied to avoid conflict with those of
the EEC. In that context, the antitrust authorities of the
Member States of the EEC are required to collaborate
with the EC Commission to ensure the general implementation of EEC antitrust provisions in their respective national territories. However, the lack of appropriate EEC
antitrust law in particular situations 27 entitles the antitrust authorities of the Member States of the EEC to apply
their own national antitrust laws in such situations.28
As far as the substantive provisions of the EEC Treaty
are concerned, it is important to examine those of article
85 before proceeding to examine those of article 86. The
provisions of article 85(1) of the EEC treaty outlaw both
the formation of cartels and the conclusion of various
forms of restrictive business or commercial transactions,
each because of its incompatibility with the establishment
and the operation of the European Common Market.
Agreements between business or commercial enterprises,
concerted practices on the part of such enterprises, and
decisions of an association of such enterprises may become legally prohibited for as long as they are characterized by two factors. Such agreements, concerted
practices, and decisions are prohibited if, first, they have
the effect of distorting, preventing, or restricting economic competition within the European Common Mar26 [1969] 8 COMMON MKT. L.R. 100. The significance of the case lies in its making it clear that the EEC antitrust authorities are ready to treat as invalid any provision of the antitrust law of a Member State of the EEC which is incompatible
with that of the antitrust law of the EEC. Before the EC Court's preliminary ruling in the case, the legal position was uncertain. Cf., e.g., Markert, The Dyestuff Case.
A Contribution to the Relationship Between the Antitrust Laws of the European Economic
Community and Its Member States, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1969).
V7 This is true particularly where alleged restrictive or monopolistic business or
commercial practices do not tend to have an adverse impact on the conduct of
trade between the Member States of the EEC or where the EC Commission may
have decided to close its files on individual cases.
28 See, e.g., The Preliminary Ruling of the EC Court in joined Cases 253/78, 1 to
3/79, Procureur de la Republique v. Guerlain, S.A. and Others, [1981] 19 CoM-

MON MKT. L.R. 99.
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ket, 29

and second, they have an adverse impact on the
conduct of trade between the Member States of the
EEC.3
From the foregoing EEC Treaty provisions it may be
assumed that business or commercial agreements, concerted practices, and group decisions of enterprises which
are not characterized by the envisaged conditions or factors would not be prohibited by the EEC Treaty provisions. However, there is some evidence to suggest that
EEC Treaty requirements are often construed and applied
by the antitrust authorities of the EEC in a rather flexible
manner. Consequently, various agreements, concerted
practices, and decisions of business or commercial enterprises which may not have constituted primafacie breaches
of EEC antitrust law have been treated as constituting actual violations.'
Be that as it may, there are particular forms of business
or commercial activity or practice which article 85(1) of
the EEC Treaty seeks to prohibit. Thus, business or commercial activities which, directly or indirectly, exhibit any
of the following features are sought to be directly prohibited: (1) price fixing; 2 (2) imposing onerous trading conditions; 33 (3) controlling or limiting production, markets,
29

EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(1), at 47-48.

o Id.

11 See, e.g., Case 56/65, Societe Technique Miniere v. Societe Maschinenbau
Ulm, [1966] 6 COMMON MKT. L.R. 197; Joined Cases 48 to 57/69, Imperial
Chemical Indus. Ltd. v. EC Comm'n, [1972] 9 COMMON MYT. L.R. 494. See also Re
Davison Rubber Co., [1972] 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 143), 11 COMMON MKT.
L.R. D52, D67; Re Vacuum Interrupters Ltd., [1977] 20 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L
48) 32, 19 COMMON MKT. L.R. D67.
.2
See, e.g., Joined Cases 48 to 57/69, Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd. (I.C.I.) v.
EC Comm'n, [1972] 11 COMMON MKT. L.R. 494; IFTRA Rules for Producers of
Virgin Aluminum, [1975] 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 228), 16 COMMON MKT. L.R.
D20; Case 73/74; Groupement des Facricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v. EC
Comm'n, [1976] 17 COMMON MKT. L.R. 589.
3. See, e.g., Pabst & Richarzkg v. BNIA, [1976] 18 COMMON MKT. L. R. D63
(relating to an agreement not to supply a product in bulk); Case 73/74, Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v. EC Comm'n, [1976] 17
COMMON MKT. L.R. 589. (involving an agreement to sell only on prescribed general conditions of sale).
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technical development, or investment; 34 (4) partitioning
markets or sharing sources of supply; 35 (5) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties and thereby placing the latter at a competitive disadvantage;36 and (6) rendering the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by other contracting parties of supplementary obligations customarily unconnected with the subject-matter of such contracts.
Business or commercial activities or transactions which
exhibit any of the foregoing characteristics become automatically void.3 8 Consequently, those activities are incapable of being invoked or relied upon in any proceedings
before the competent institutions of the EEC; furthermore, they cannot be pleaded against third parties.3 9 By
the same token, they cannot be pleaded or relied upon
before the competent antitrust authorities of the individual Member States of the EEC. Indeed, this exclusion was
.4 See, e.g., Buchler & Co. v. EC Comm'n [1967-70 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8084, 8214-21; Boehringer Mannheim Gmbh v. EC Comm'n
[1967-70 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8085, 8242-49 (involving
the fixing of product quotas); Re Belgian Central Heating Agreement, [1972]
COMMON MKT. L.R. D130 (concerning an agreement between manufacturers and
installers of central heating that only equipment certified by the parties as satisfying certain standards would be purchased).
'. See, e.g., Re Van Katwijk N.V's Agreement, [1970] 9 COMMON MKT. L.R. D43;
Re Omega Watches, [ 1970] 9 COMMON MKT. L.R. D49; Re Agreement of William
Prym-Werke KG [1973] 12 COMMON MKT. L.R. D250; Re Franco-Japanese
Ballbearings Agreement, [1974] 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 343) 19, [1975] 15
COMMON MKT. L.R. D8; Re the French and Taiwanese Mushroom Packers, [1975]
15 COMMON MKT. L.R. D83. For an examination of the subject, see Bentil, Control
of Market-Sharing Agreements Under EEC Cartel Law, 26 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 188
(1975).
,, See, e.g., Re German Ceramic Tiles Discount Agreement, [1971] COMMON
MKT. L.R. D6; Re Gas Water-Heaters, [1973] 12 COMMON MKT. L.R. D231; Case
85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. AG v. EC Comm'n., [1979] 26 COMMON MKT.
L.R. 211 (involving the negotiating of aggregated rebate cartels).
.1 See, e.g., Re the Application of UNIDI, [1975] 18 J. 0. EUR. COMM. (No. L
228) 180, [1975] 16 COMMON MKT. L.R. D51; Re CECIMO, [1969] 13 J.O. EUR.
COMM. (No. L69), [1969] 8 COMMON MKT L.R. Dl; Re CEMATEX, 26J.O. EUR.
CoMM. (No. 227) (1971), [1973] 12 COMMON MKT. L.R. D135 (involving restrictive conditions associated with the holding of trade exhibitions or fairs).
- EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(2).
See e.g., Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA, [1972] COMMON MKT.
L.R. 81, 97-98.
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implicit in the recent preliminary ruling of the EC Court
in the joined cases of Procureurde la Republique v. Bruno Giry
and Guerlain S.A. 40
However, it may not be assumed that the prohibition
under article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty is of an absolute
character. On the contrary, exemptions are available
under certain economic conditions. Consequently, individual business or commercial agreements between enterprises, concerted practices on the part of such enterprises,
and decisions by an association of such enterprises may
qualify for an exemption should they meet the relevant
economic conditions or criteria. 4 ' Thus, should they improve the production or distribution of goods, or promote technical or economic progress while still allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, they may
then be exempted from the EEC legal prohibition. Even
then, however, such enterprises would need to be less restrictive of economic competition with respect to a substantial proportion of the goods involved.
At first sight it might be thought that the provisions of
40 [1981] 31 COMMON MKT. L.R. 99.
In this case, the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris requested that the EC Court rule on the legality of the establishment of selective distribution systems for certain perfumery products within parts
of France. The request to the EC Court was made following criminal proceedings
instituted before the competent French court against the defendant suppliers of
the products in question for allegedly charging illegal prices. The institution of
the criminal proceedings was prompted by complaints with claims for damages
lodged by some retailers of perfumery products to whom the defendant companies had refused to sell such products. In response to the complaints, the defendant companies sought to justify their refusal to sell the required perfumery
products to the plaintiff retailers on the basis that (1) there already existed legitimate distribution systems for the products in question; and (2) the agreements on
which those systems were based had been authorized by the EC Commission. In
an earlier application to the EC Commission for negative clearance in respect of
the agreements establishing the selective distribution systems concerned, the EC
Commission appears to have granted such application. However, in its preliminary ruling, the EC Court appears to have seen nothing untoward about the competent French authorities exercising their antitrust jurisdiction in respect of the
matter. Thus, the EC Court maintained that the EEC antitrust law did "not prevent the application of national provisions prohibiting a refusal to sell even where
the agreements relied upon for the purpose ofjustifying that refusal have formed
the subject-matter of a decision by the [EC] Commission to close the file on the
case." Id. at 136-37.
4
ECC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(3) at 48.
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article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty are concerned primarily
with the control or the regulation of anticompetitive business or commercial practices as they pertain to the sale or
supply of goods. Yet, article 85(1) is also concerned with
the control or regulation of similar practices in the service
sector of the economy. Indeed, the EC Court and the EC
Commission have sought to underline this in their recent
jurisprudence. In SRL Ufficio Hanry van Emeyde v. SRL Ufficio Centrale Italiano di Assistnza Assicurative Automobilisti in
Circolazione Internationale (UCI), 4 2 the EC Court indicated

that the antitrust provisions of article 85(1) of the EEC
Treaty are applicable to control the anti-competitive business or commercial activities of a national insurance bureau and its members. In addition, the EC Court has
underlined the same point with respect to the restrictive
practices of commercial banks.43 Moreover, the EC Commission has stressed the same point in relation to (1) the
42

Case 90/71, [1977] E.C.R. 1091, [1977] 20 COMMON MKT. L.R. 478. The

case took the form of a request by the Tribunale Civile e Penale di Milano, to the
EC Court for preliminary ruling as to the compatibility of certain national provisions or agreements between various national insurance bureaus or their members with the antitrust laws of the EEC. The request to the EC Court for a
preliminary ruling was occasioned by proceedings brought before the competent
Italian court by an Italian subsidiary of a Netherlands company which was carrying
on business as a loss-adjuster in the insurance business. In those proceedings, the
company sued the UCI (the Italian Clearing Office for International Motor Vehicle Insurance) on the ground that either by a decision of the latter or its members,
or by a concerted practice on the part of such members, the plaintiff company had
been improperly excluded from the market in which it had specialized. The relevant market was for the settlement of claims arising from accidents caused by
foreign vehicles in Italy. In 1972, the EEC established a uniform motor vehicle
accident insurance system (best known as the "green card system"), in conformity
with which the individual national motor vehicle accident insurance systems are
meant to operate.
In its preliminary ruling the EC Court pointed out that the relevant EEC laws
should not be regarded as authorizing the existence of national provisions or
agreements between national insurance bureaus, or their members, which conflicted with the antitrust rules and procedures of the EEC. However, the EC
Court maintained that a national provision or agreement between national insurance bureaus, in the context of the green card system, which declared the national
bureaus to bear sole responsibility for the investigation and settlement of damage
claims caused in the given EEC Member State by foreign vehicles to be compatible with the antitrust rules of the EEC.
43 See, e.g., Case 172/80, Gerhard Zuchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank AG
(1981) E.C.R. 2021, [1982] 33 COMMON MKT. L.R. 313.
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restrictive business practices of an association of property
insurers;14 (2) the anti-competitive practices of artists,
such as leading opera singers;4 5 and (3) restrictive commercial practices associated with the holding of international exhibitions or trade fairs.46
Clearly, therefore, the antitrust provisions of article 85
of the EEC Treaty are applicable to the different forms of
anti-competitive commercial practice engaged in by operators in the air transportation industry. In other words,
since the air transportation industry undertakes the provision of services for the public, its anti-competitive commercial practices are controllable by means of the
antitrust provisions of article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Consequently, it is understandable that the EC Commission
should seek to bring about this result.
Apart from the antitrust provisions of article 85 of the
EEC Treaty, article 86 of the same Treaty seeks to control
monopolistic, oligopolistic, monopsonic, or oligopsonic
market power, as exercised by enterprises within the European Common Market. The mere existence of such
power alone does not constitute an infringment of article
86. Rather, only the abuse of that power constitutes a violation. Although article 86 of the EEC Treaty is underpinned by the concepts of "dominant market position"
and "abuse," such concepts are undefined. It has, therefore, been left to the antitrust authorities of the EEC to
define the nature and scope of application of such conSee, e.g., Re Industrial Fire Ins., [1982] 34 COMMON MKT. L.R. 159.
See, e.g., Re Unitel Film-und Fernseh-Produktionsgesellschaft GmbH & Co.
(78/516/EEC), [1978] 23 COMMON MKT. L.R. 306.
-6 See, e.g., Re Application of the Union Nazionale Industrie Dentare Italiane
(UNIDI), [1975] 14 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 220) (1975), [1975] 16 COMMON MKT.
L.R. D51; Re Comite European de Cooperation des Industries de la Mahine Outile (CECIMO), [1969] J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 69) (1969), 8 COMMON MKT.
L.R. DI; Re Comite European des Constructevrs de Materieel Textile (CEMATEX) (71/337/EEC); [1971]J.O. EUR. COMM. L227/26 of Oct. 8, 1971, [1973]
12 COMMON MKT. L.R. D135; Re International Permanent Bureau of Motor Mfrs.
(BPICA) (77/722/EEC), 18 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. 229) (1977), [1977] 20 CoMMON MKT. L.R. D43; Re Society of Motor Mfrs. and Traders Ltd. (SMM&T): Notice of the EC Comm'n, OJ. EUR. COMM. C 216/2 (1980), [1980] 29 COMMON
44

45

MKT. L.R. 119.
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cepts.47 At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that
virtually the same business or commercial activities which
are sought to be prohibited by article 85 of the EEC
Treaty are treated similarly within the provisions of article
86 of the Treaty. Conversely, whereas article 85 provides
for an exemption for particular restrictive business or
commercial practices, article 86 alludes only slightly to
any such exemption. This may reflect the desire of the
drafters of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty to
ensure that market concentration, more than the other
forms of restrictive business or commercial practice, was
kept under very strict control.
Just as the provisions of article 85 of the EEC Treaty are
applicable in both the goods and the services sectors of
the EEC economy for the control of anti-competitive business or commercial practices, the same is true of the application of the provisions of article 86 of the Treaty. The
EC Court's preliminary ruling in each of the following
cases makes this inclusiveness apparent: SRL Ufficio Henry
van Ameyde v. Sr. Ufficio Centrale Italiano di Assistnza Assicurativea Automobiliste in Circolazione Internationale(UCI),4" General Motors Continental IN. v. EC Comm'n,49 Greenwidh Film
Production v. Societe des Suterus, Compositeurset Editiurs de Misique (SACEM) and Another,5 0 Gerhard Zuchner v. Bayerische
Vereinsbank AG. 5 The provisions of article 86 of the EEC
Treaty are applicable to regulate abuses of dominant market power in the air transportation industry within the
EEC.
47 For an indication of what constitutes a "dominant market position" and its
"abuse," see, e.g., Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. EC Comm'n, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 COMMON MKT. L.R. 309;
Joined Cases 4-48, 50, 54-56, 111 &, 113-114/73, Cooperatieve Verneniging
"Suiker Unie UA" and Others v. EC Comm'n, [1975] E.C.R. 1663; [1976] 17
COMMON MKT. L.R. 295; United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental BV v.
E.C. Comm'n, [1978] E.C.R. 217, [1978] 21 COMMON MKT. L.R. 429; HoffmannLa Roche & Co. AG v. EC Comm'n, [1979] E.C.R. 461, [1979] 26 COMMON MKT.
L.R. 211.
48

See supra note 42.

Case 26/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1367, [1976] 19 COMMON
Case 22/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3275, [1980] 27 COMMON
51 1981 E. COMM. CT.J. REP. 2021, [1981] 33 COMMON
49

50

MKT.
MKT.
MKT.

L.R. 195.
L.R. 629.
L.R. 313.
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Essential ProceduralProvisions of EEC Antitrust Law

[50

As already noted, some of the procedural provisions of
antitrust law are to be found in article 85(3) of the EEC
Treaty, while others are contained in major EEC secondary legislation. The administration of the exemption
provisions of article 85(3) is entrusted to the EC Commission. In this regard, the EC Commission has the power to
exempt individual business or commercial practices from
the legal prohibition under article 85(1) if it considers
that the necessary economic criteria are likely to be
satisfied.
Obviously, the EC Commission is obligated to weigh
various economic factors before deciding to grant an exemption. It is also evident that when refusing to grant an
exemption, the EC Commission is bound to give tenable
economic reasons. The EEC Treaty, however, does not
clarify whether refusal is reviewable by the EC Court at
the insistence of an aggrieved business or commercial enterprise. Nevertheless, aggrieved business or commercial
enterprises appear to have an indirect means of getting
the EC Court to review a refusal of the EC Commission.
That is, the issue may be raised by an aggrieved business
or commercial enterprise when it appeals to the EC
Court against a decision of the EC Commission which
may have adjudged it guilty of violating the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty or which may have imposed
some legal or financial sanction on it. 52 It is important to
note that the EC Commission is vested with discretionary
power to attach conditions and obligations to any exemption granted by it.53
In addition to its task of administering the system of exemptions envisaged under article 85(3), the EC Commission is also vested with the power of granting "negative
clearance," as provided by the first major EEC antitrust
.' EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17, art. 8, as adopted by the EC Council, 13
J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
5s

Id.
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secondary legislation for the implementation of the substantive provisions of articles 85 and 86. 54 The EC Commission is required to grant such negative clearance as
long as the evidence at its disposal suggests that the business or commercial agreement between enterprises does
not constitute a prima facie breach of article 85(1). 5 5 In
other words, the EC Commission may rule that particular
forms of agreements between business or commercial enterprises are incapable or less capable of occasioning a
breach of the antitrust provisions of article 85. The procedure of negative clearance provides a legal safeguard
by which business or commercial enterprises which are
uncertain whether particular activities constitute an infringement of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty
may become more certain of the legality or the validity of
such activities.
It is apparent that there is a difference between the EC
Commission's power to grant an exemption and its power
to grant negative clearance. While the granting of negative clearance presupposes no primafacie violations of article 85(1), the granting of an exemption allows business
or commercial transactions which constitute primafacie violations or infringements of EEC Treaty provisions. This
seems to be the principal rationale for grounding the
grant of an exemption upon the presence of prescribed
economic criteria. In the exercise of its power to grant
negative clearance, however, the EC Commission is not
expected to eschew economic considerations; nonetheless, it may take economic considerations into account
only in general terms.5 6
.4 See generally EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17,
13 J.O. CoMM. EUR. 204
(1962).
EEC Antitrust Regulatiox.No. 17, art. 2, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
"
For an examination and assessment of the distinction of the two procedural
mechanisms, exemption and negative clearance, see Bentil, International Trade
Fairs Under EEC Competition Law, 124 NEW L.J. 193, 194-95 (1974); Bentil, The Prohibition of Resale Price Maintenance Under the Commercial Law of the European Economic
Community, 3 ANGLO AM. L. REV. 380, 381-87 (1974); Bentil, A ComparativeStudy of
the Regulation of the Practices of Resale Price Maintenance in Australian and EEC Restrictive Trade PracticesLaws, 10 U. OF QUEENSLAND L.J. 172, 181 (1978); C.W. BELLAMY
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It is possible for applications to be made in a given case
for the granting of both an exemption and negative clearance, although the grants affect separate parts or sections
of an agreement, decision, or concerted practice on the
It has been
part of business or commercial enterprises.
observed in one leading textbook on EEC antitrust law
that "there is little point in applying for negative clearance for an agreement without at the same time notifying
for an exemption under Article 85(3) [of the EEC
Treaty.]" ' 58 Even then, it cannot be overlooked that the
two forms of EEC procedural mechanisms could be invoked as alternatives, rather than as a composite.
Moreover, the EC Commission is vested with the power
of issuing a cease and desist order against a business or
commercial enterprise which acts in breach of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty. 59 Additionally, the EC
Commission is empowered to impose fines 6° or periodic
penalty payments 6 ' on business or commercial enterprises
in violation of the treaty. Fines may be imposed where
individual business or commercial enterprises intentionally or negligently: (1) supply incorrect or misleading information to the EC Commission in an application for
negative clearance; (2) supply incorrect information in response to a request, made by the EC Commission, in the
course of an antitrust investigation; 62 (3) produce reCHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 144-47 (1st ed. 1973); D.
BAROUNOUS, D. HALL &J.JAMES, EEC ANTI-TRUST LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE,

& G.D.

251-52 (1975).
.11See, e.g., Re Schwarzwalder Apparate-Bau-Anstalt August Schwer unde
Sohne GmbH (SABA), 19 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 119) (1976), [1976] 17 COMMON MKT. L.R. D61, in which the EC Commission granted both exemption and
negative clearance at the same time. This was upheld by the EC Court in a subsequent appeal concerning the same case. Metro-SB-Grossmakte GmbH & Co. KF
v. EC Comm'n (1977) E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 22 COMMON MKT. L.R. 1.
C. W. BELLAMY & G.D. CHILD, supra note 56, at 110.
'' EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17, art. 3, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
" EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17, art. 15, 13J.0. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).

EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17, art. 16, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
For example, in The Community v. Telos SA, [1982] 33 COMMON MKT. L.R.
267, the EC Commission imposed a maximum fine on a French firm for providing
inaccurate answers to questions by officials of the EC Commission during the
course of an antitrust investigation. Equally, in the case of The Community v. SA
(12
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quired books or other business or commercial records in
incomplete form during the course of antitrust investigations by the EC Commission into alleged or suspected violations of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty; 6 3 or
(4) refuse to submit to an investigation order, issued by
the EC Commission, regarding alleged or suspected violations of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty.64 In
any of the foregoing situations, the EC Commission is to
take account of both the gravity and the duration of a violation of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty when
it fixes the amount of a fine.65
Conversely, the imposition of periodic penalty payments by the EC Commission is meant to compel delinquent business or commercial enterprises to: (1) end
infringement of the antitrust provisions of the EEC
Treaty; (2) refrain from any act where the EC Commission
National Panasonic (Belgium) NV, 18 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113) (1982), [1982]
34 COMMON MKT. L.R. 410, the EC Commission imposed a fine on a Belgian company because the Managing Director of the company's subsidiary knowingly provided false information during the course of an antitrust investigation by officials
of the EC Commission. Furthermore, in The Community v. National Panasonic
(France) S.A., 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 211) (1982), [1982] 35 COMMON MKT.

L.R. 623, the EC Commission imposed a fine on a French company for providing
incorrect information in response to a request for price lists during an antitrust
inquiry.
- In The Community v. Fabbrica Lastre di Vetro Pietro Sciarra, Oj. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 75) (1980), [1980] 23 COMMON MKT. L.R. 362, the EC Commission

imposed a fine on an Italian company for failing to produce all correspondence
connected with the glass industry during an antitrust investigation by officials of
the EC Commission. It also appears that a deliberate attempt to withhold particular business documents or records from the attention of the EC Commission may
be the functional equivalent of producing business documents or records in incomplete form. For example, in The Community v. Fabbrica Pisani, O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 75) (1980), [1980] 28 COMMON MKT. L.R. 354, the EC Commission

imposed a fine on an Italian company for not making available to officials of the
EC Commission some highly relevant business documents during an antitrust
investigation.
'A See The Community v. Federation Nationale de L'Industrie de la Chaussure
de France, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 319) (1982), [1983] 36 COMMON MKT. L.R.

575, where the EC Commission imposed a fine on a French trade association for
deliberately refusing to produce minutes of its council and other management
bodies when ordered to do so by the EC Commission.
a., EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17, art. 15(2), 13J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
For the text of the EEC Antitrust Regulations, see D. BAROUNOUS, EEC ANTITRUST

LAw 328-29 (1975).
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has revoked or amended its decision or prohibition of
particular antitrust activities; (3) supply complete and correct information requested by the EC Commission during
an antitrust investigation; or (4) submit to an investigation
ordered by the EC Commission regarding an alleged or
suspected violation of the antitrust provisions of the EEC
Treaty 66

In any of the foregoing circumstances decisions of the
EC Commission are reviewable by the EC Court.67 In
other words, the EC Court is empowered to review decisions of the EC Commission which impose a fine or periodic penalty payment on a business or commercial
enterprise. Before the EC Court can exercise its powers
of review, business or commercial enterprises must apply
to the EC Court. Through the exercise of its review powers the EC Court may cancel, 68 reduce, 69 or increase 70 a
fine or periodic penalty payment imposed by the EC Com- EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17, art. 16(1), 13J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
,7 EEC Antitrust Regulation No. 17, art. 17, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
(, See, e.g., General Motors Continental NV v. EC Commission, [1975] E.C.R.
1367, [1976] 17 COMMON MKT. L.R. 95, where the EC Court annulled a decision
of the EC Commission by which a fine had been imposed on the plaintiff firm for
an alleged violation of article 86 of the EEC Treaty. The EC Court appears to
have based its annulment of the relevant decision of the EC Commission on the
fact that there had been no abuse of a dominant market position by the plaintiff
firm. Equally, in Groupement des Fabricantsde Papiers Peints de Beligique and Others v.
EC Commission, [1975] E.C.R. 491, [1976] 17 COMMON MKT. L.R. 589, the EC
Court annulled, for lack of adequate reasons, the part of the decision of the EC
Commission by which a fine had been imposed on a trading group of five Belgian
wall-paper producers and importers. Futhermore, in Hugin Kassaregister AB and
Another v. EC Comm'n [1979] E.C.R. 1969, [1979] 26 COMMON MKT. L.R. 345,
the EC Court annulled a decision of the EC Commission by which a fine had been
imposed on a Swedish company and its British subsidiary for an alleged refusal to
supply spare parts for the plaintiff company's machines. The EC Court's annulment of the EC Commission's decision appears to have been based on the ground
that the alleged conduct of the two companies concerned had no actual or potential effect on interstate trade in the EEC.
'-" See, e.g., Joined Cases 48-57/69, I.C.I. Ltd. and Others v. EC Comm'n, supra
note 32,Joined Cases 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. EC Commission, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 13 CoMMON MKT. L.R. 309; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. EC Comm'n, [1979] E.C.R.
461, [1979] 26 COMMON MKT. L.R. 211.
70 As far as this discussion is concerned, the EC Court appears not to have
found it necessary to increase the amount of a fine or periodic penalty payment
imposed by the EC Commission on individual business or commercial enterprises.
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mission. It is conceivable that the EC Court could annul,
as well as reduce, a fine or periodic penalty payment. 1
This presupposes, however, the imposition of multiple
fines or periodic penalty payments on two or more business or commercial enterprises, or the imposition of different categories of penalty on individual enterprises.
Another feature of the procedural framework of the
EEC's antitrust legal system relates to the extraterritorial
application or enforcement of the provisions of articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty. Although neither the actual
provisions of the EEC Treaty nor those of EEC Regulation No. 17 seek to cater to extraterritorial application or
enforcement of the antitrust provisions of the EEC
73
Treaty, both the EC Court 72 and the EC Commission
have sought to bring about that result.74 The extraterritorial application or enforcement of the antitrust law of the
EEC is generally based on: (1) the so-called antitrust "effects doctrine; ' ' 75 (2) the fact that a foreign parent com7, See, e.g., Joined Cases, 40-48/73, 50/73, 54-56/73, 111/73, 113-14/73,
"Suiker Unie" UA v. EC Comm'n, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 17 COMMON MKT.

L.R. 295; United Brands Co. & United Brands Continentaal v. EC Comm'n,

[1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 21 COMMON MKT. L.R. 429.
72 See, e.g., Case 22/17, Beguelin Import Co. v. SAGL Import Export, supra note
39; Joined Cases 48-57/69, I.C.I. Ltd. v. EC Comm'n, supra note 31; Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. EC Comm'n, [1973] 12 COMMON MKT. L.R.
199; Joined Cases 6-7/73, Istituto Chemoterapico Italiano spA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. EC Comm'n, supra note 69; Case 18/77, Tepea V.V. v. EC Comm'n,
[1978] 23 COMMON MKT. L.R. 392; Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v.
EC Comm'n, supra note 69.
7- See, e.g., In Re Franco-Japanese Ballbearings Agreement (74/634/EEC), 17
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 343) (1974), [1975] 15 COMMON MKT. L.R. D8, Re The
French and Taiwanese Mushroom Packers Agreement (75/77/EEC), 18 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 29) (1975) 26, [1975] 15 COMMON MKT. L.R. D83; Wilkes v. Theal

N.V. & Watts Ltd. (77/129/EEC), 20

OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) (1977) 19,

[1977] 19 COMMON MKT. L.R. D44.
71 For

a consideration of the extraterritorial exercise by antitrust authorities of

the EEC of their jurisdiction, see Bentil, Extra-territorialEffect of E.E.C. Anti-Trust
Law, THE SCOTs L. TIMES 149 (1975); Bentil, Control of the Abuse of Monopoly Power
in EEC Business Law, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 59, 65-66 (1975); Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35

(1973).
- The doctrine is that national administrative bodies or tribunals are entitled to
exercise jurisdiction over activities outside their respective national territories, as
long as such activities affect aspects of life in the territories concerned. For an
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pany has a subsidiary established within the European
Common Market area;7 6 (3) the fact that a foreign parent
company is the grantor of trading concessions with respect to its products to concessionaires in the EEC;7 7 or
(4) a combination of two or all three of the foregoing
grounds.
Arguably, extraterritorial application or enforcement of
EEC antitrust law has tended to be less obtrusive, resulting in little or no controversy or foreign governmental objection. This contrasts with the political and economic
controversies surrounding extraterritorial application or
enforcement of the antitrust laws of the United States.78
Futhermore, it should be noted that neither the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty nor those of EEC Regulation No. 17 attempt to allow persons aggrieved by the
proven anti-competitive business or commercial practices
of individual enterprises to sue for damages before the
EC Commission or the EC Court. Neither has the EC
Court nor the EC Commission found it necessary to rule
on that issue.79 Indeed, it has been observed that "[t]here
exists as yet no case law of the EC Court ofJustice [of] the
possibility for injured third parties (competitors, buyers,
and suppliers) and for injured parties to sue for damages
evaluation of the doctrine, see the Report of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-

opment [OECDG], entitled Restrictive Business Practicesof Multinational Enterprises, at
37-38 (1977).
76 See, e.g., Joined Cases 48-57/69, I.C.I. Ltd. v. EC Comm'n, supra note 32; Re
Pittsburgh Corning Europe, (1972) 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 272) 35; [1972]
COMMON MKT. L.R. D2; Erim Pharm GmbH v. Johnson & Jameson Inc., 23 0. J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) (1980) 16; [1981] 31 COMMON MKT. L.R. 287.
77 See,
78 For

e.g., Re Pittsburgh Corning Europe, supra note 76.
example, reference should be made to the reaction of the Australian
Commonwealth Parliament, in enacting the Foreign Antitrust (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of 1979, as a means of expressing its resentment of the extraterritorial enforcement of the antitrust laws of the United States against Australianbased companies. In addition, the British Parliament passed the Protection of
Trading Interests Act of 1980 for the same reason.
71,This contrasts with the right of individual aggrieved parties to sue for damages of all kinds under the antitrust laws of the United States.
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against parties to prohibited agreement ....,,so However, while an aggrieved third party may lack the necessary legal standing to institute proceedings before the EC
Court in the envisaged context, it is arguable that such
person may be able to bring a tort action for damages
before a national court or tribunal.8 '
III.

GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE ATrEMPT TO
REGULATE RESTRICTIVE COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
OF THE

EEC

A number of issues arise in the context of anti-competitive commercial practices in the air transportation industry in the EEC. First of all, it is necessary to consider the
basic difficulties which relate to the application of existing
EEC antitrust law for the possible regulation of anti-competitive commercial activities in the air transportation industry of the EEC. Second, it is necessary to consider the
efforts of the EC Commission in submitting a proposal to
the EC Council for the adoption and the promulgation of
an appropriate EEC secondary legislation for the effective
control of anti-competitive commercial activities.
" P. KAPTEYN & P. VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, 262-263 (1973).
" Cf, e.g., id., where it is observed that "[i]n general it is assumed that parties
injured by prohibited agreement can indeed sue for damages [of all kinds] in accordance with the rules of municipal law." Id. at 263. It is noteworthy that in the
recent English case of Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd., [1983] 3 W.L.R.

143, [1983] 2 All E.R. 770, [1983] 33 COMMON MKT. L.R. 43, the House of Lords
was called upon to pronounce on the entitlement of a company to both damages

and injunctive relief upon the finding of a breach by the dependent municipal
corporation of some provisions of EEC antitrust law. By a four to one vote, the
House of Lords held that relief in damages, rather than injunction, was the relief
available to the appellant company against the respondent public corporation.
Although the decision of the House of Lords may have been tentative, the legal

significance of some of its underlying principles can hardly be ignored.
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Problems and Issues Concerning the Application of Existing
Antitrust Provisions of the EEC Treaty to the Air
Transportation Industry

A.

Although the drafters of the EEC Treaty contemplated
82
the establishment of an EEC common transport policy,
only rail, road, and inland waterway transportation systems were meant to be directly subsumed under EEC
transportation policy. 83 Nevertheless, the systems of air
and sea transportation could be subsumed under a common transport policy after the EC Council has unanimously adopted appropriate EEC secondary legislation.84
The procedure to be followed, however, by the EC Council in adopting appropriate EEC control measures is unclear. As has been observed by one writer, "[a]rticle 84(2)
[of the EEC Treaty] is exceptional in that it does not lay
down the procedure whereby [EC] Council decisions may
be adopted for the air and maritime sectors. '8' 5 Therefore, until such time as the EC Council adopts the necessary EEC control measures to bring the systems of air and
sea transportation within the ambit of the EEC's common
transport policy, the two systems of transportation would
seem to fall outside the limits of direct and proper EEC
regulation. Unfortunately, the EC Council has as yet
failed to bring the two systems of transportation within
of application of an EEC common
the general scope
86
transport policy.
It may have been thought that the antitrust provisions
of the EEC Treaty could not be utilized to regulate anticompetitive commercial practices engaged in by operators
EEC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 73-83.
EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 84(1).
S4 EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 84(2).
8
Close, Article 84 EEC: The Development of Transport Policy in the Sea and Air Sectors, 5 EUR. L. REV. 188, 197 (1980).
- See, e.g., Dagtoglou, Air Transport and the European Community, 6 EUR. L. REV.
335 (1981), where it is pointed out that the EC Council "has remained inactive for
decades even though air transport has become increasingly important and there
has been no lack of suggestions and proposals from the [EC] Commission, particularly in recent years."
'2

"
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in the air and sea transportation industries.8 7 As the EC
Commission observed of the issue in 1975,
[T]he law as it now stands does not allow for the consistent application of the rules of competition to sea and air
transport in a manner reflecting the special features of
these industries. Furthermore, the fact that there are no
precise provisions for the application of Articles 85 and 86
[of the EEC Treaty] to them makes for uncertainty in the
is to the disadvantage of shippers, airlines
law, and this
88
and users.
Concurrently, however, the EC Court had indicated
otherwise. 9 The EC Court maintained that there was no
reason why the antitrust provision of the EEC Treaty
could not be utilized to regulate the various anti-competitive commercial practices of the operators of the air and
sea transportation systems in the EEC. Despite the fact
that the EC Court's ruling offered a great deal of encouragement to the EC Commission, 90 in the EC Commision's
efforts at formulating an appropriate proposal for EEC
secondary legislation 9 i it continued to encounter difficulties in dealing with cases in that area.
This became apparent when, for example, the EC Commission was confronted with ruling in the case of Sterling
Airways. 92 The case involved a complaint by a Danish private airline, Sterling Airways, against Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) and the Danish Government. The
87

Cf Close, supra note 85, at 188; Dagtoglou, supra note 86, at 335.

88EC Commission's Fifth Report on Competition Policy, at 25 (Brussels-Luxembourg, Apr. 1976).

89 Case 167/73, Re French Merchant Seamen: EC Commission v. The French

Republic, [1974] E.C.R. 359, [1974] 14 COMMON MKT. L.R. 216.

:1Cf, e.g., EC Commission's Fifth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 88,
at 24.

mIt should be noted that the EC Council found its way clear to adopt an EEC
secondary legislation for the effective application of the antitrust provisions of the
EEC Treaty to control anti-competitive business or commercial activities with respect to rail, road and inland waterway transportation in the EEC in 1968. See
EEC Regulation No 1017/68; O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 1750) [1968] 7 COMMON
MKT. L.R. 2761.
112See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
20.
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complaint was founded principally upon two issues: (1)
that the SAS had, by virtue of its monopoly power in the
Danish air transportation industry, prevented Sterling
Airways from entering the international scheduled flights
market in general, and the Copenhagen-London route in
particular, as well as from entering certain sectors of the
charter market; and (2) that the Danish government, in its
position as regulator of Danish airspace, had allowed SAS
to abuse its dominant market position by charging excessive fares on the Copenhagen-London route, contrary to
the antitrust provisions of article 86 of the EEC Treaty.93
On the question of the abuse of a dominant market position, the EC Commission found that as a result of prorating arrangements,94 SAS's average revenue per
passenger was below the standard economy fare. Furthermore, the EC Commission took the view that there were
numerous obstacles to the establishment of a valid comparison between airline enterprises and the way they operated economically. Consequently, the EC Commission
stated that on the basis of the latest available information,
the fares involved "were no longer unnecessarily high. ' '95
Moreover, the commission ruled that the alleged anticompetitive commercial practices of SAS no longer infringed on the provisions of article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
In the end, therefore, the EC Commission formed the
opinion that "there were no longer any grounds for it to
consider the further action." 96 However, the EC Commission appears to have been rather unsure of its conclusion in view of the uncertain nature of the relevant EEC
law.
On the second issue, concerning the exclusion of Sterling Airways from entering the international scheduled
t,5 See id. at 94-96.
94 This is the system by which several airlines share the revenue of a throughtravel, non-stop ticket when the passenger completes his journey in stages, traveling on aircraft belonging to different airline companies.
w5See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
95.
9,6 Id.
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flight market, the Copenhagen-London route, and certain
sectors of the charter market, the EC Commission appears
to have been even more uncertain of its tasks. The EC
Commission stated that "in the prevailing legal situation
and in the light of the information it had at its disposal," it
would be inappropriate to dispute the legality, in terms of
EEC law, "of the grant of special or exclusive rights to
SAS or of the refusal to grant them to Sterling Airways." 9 7
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the recent EEC case of
Lord Nicholas William Bethell v. EC Commission,98 decided by
the EC Court, highlighted the lack of appropriate EEC
legal control measures and mechanisms for dealing with
alleged anti-competitive commercial practices of airlines
in the EEC, with particular reference to the fixing of fares
for passenger air transportation. The case itself related to
an action brought by Lord Bethell, a member of the EC
Parliament and also of the British House of Lords, against
the EC Commission. As a regular user of scheduled air
passenger services in the EEC, and as Chairman of the
Freedom of the Skies Campaign,99 Lord Bethell entered
into a lengthy exchange of correspondence with the EC
Commission with respect to the determination of passenger fares on scheduled flights within the EEC.
In particular, Lord Bethell noted that competition in air
fares between the various European airlines was substantially restricted by a network of bilateral and multilateral
agreements. In view of this, Lord Bethell requested that
the EC Commission take appropriate measures within the
general antitrust legal framework of the EEC. The EC
Commission conducted preliminary investigations into
the complaint, even though Lord Bethell himself appears
to have acknowledged the absence of any applicable EEC
97

Id. at 96.

Case 246/81, [1982] E.C.R. 2277, [1982] 35 COMMON MKT. L.R. 300.
Freedom of the Skies is an organization dedicated to a reform of the present
system of air transportation regulation within the EEC, especially in relation to
the methods and standards by which air fares are determined or fixed. Nicholas
William Bethell v. EC Comm'n, [1982] E.C.R. 2277, 2280, [1982] 35 COMMON
MKT. L.R. 300, 301.
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regulations and despite the uncertainty as to relevant EEC
law. 'o0
Subsequently, however, the EC Commission informed
Lord Bethell that its investigations had led to the conclusion that "in most cases, the final fixing of air fares was
the sole responsibility of the Member States [of the
EEC]"'' and that "government participation generally
took the form of autonomous price-fixing measures and
not consultation between companies." 1 0 2 In view of this,
the EC Commission stated that "[t]here was no ground, in
principle, for scrutinizing the activity of either of the
States or the airlines under Article 85 [of the EEC
Treaty]."'' 0 3 At the same time, the EC Commission indicated to Lord Bethell its intention to examine the subject
in greater detail and, if necessary, take remedial action if it
were to find that "the underlying reality of fare-fixing"
was in conflict with the antitrust provisions of the EEC
04
Treaty. 1
Obviously, Lord Bethell was not satisfied with the EC
Commission's notification. Hence, he proceeded to institute an action before the EC Court against the EC Commission for an alleged failure to adopt appropriate
measures to control fare-fixing by airlines in the EEC. It
should be noted that the government of the United Kingdom and a number of the principal European airline operators applied to intervene on behalf of the respective
parties involved in the proceedings. The United Kingdom stated that it wished to intervene to support the
claim of Lord Bethell, and the principal European airlines
applied to intervene in support of the EC Commission.
The EC Court, however, ruled that Lord Bethell's claim
was inadmissible. The EC Court's ruling was based on
the purely technical ground that Lord Bethell lacked legal
, 35 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 308.
...Id. at 304.
102 Id. at 302.
10 Id.

104Id.
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standing to institute the proceedings against the EC Commission. 05 Consequently, the EC Court did not rule on
the merits or substantive issues involved in the case. Even
if the EC Court had sought to rule on the merits of the
case, it may have found it difficult to come up with any
worthwhile answers. There appears to be much uncertainty as to the nature and scope of the relevant EEC law.
Only an appropriate EEC secondary legislation, which
would seek to clarify such law, could ease the task of the
EC Commission and the EC Court.
B.

Efforts of the EC Commission to FormulateAppropriate
EEC Secondary Legislation

The EEC Treaty empowers the EC Council to act on
individual proposals from the EC Commission after consulting the EC Parliament for the purpose of adopting
and applying appropriate EEC Regulations and Directives
effecting the principles set out in articles 85 and 86.106 In
particular, the EC Commission is empowered to submit to
the EC Council a proposal to define the scope of application of the provisions of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty in the "various economic sectors."' 0 7 It is then up
to the EC Council to adopt the proposal after it has consulted the EC Parliament. Indeed, it was on the basis of
article 87(2)(c) of the EEC Treaty that the EC Commission prepared its draft of the EEC secondary legislation
on the application of the antitrust provisions of the EEC
Treaty to the anti-competitive commercial practices of
08
airlines.
Subsequent to the preparation of the draft EEC secon105Id. Articles 173 and 175 of the EEC Treaty allow only individual, natural or
juristic persons to bring legal proceedings against the EC Commission or the EC
Council in circumstances where such individuals may have been dissatisfied by a
decision or action of either of the two EEC organs. Id.
-oi
EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 87(1).
107 EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 87(2)(c).
108See EC Commission's Ninth Report on Competition Policy, at 23 (BrusselsLuxembourg, Apr. 1980); EC Commission's Sixth Report on Competition Policy,
at 22 (Brussels-Luxembourg, Apr. 1977); EC Commission's Fifth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 88, at 15.
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dary legislation, the EC Commission entered into consultation with the competent authorities of the Member
States of the EEC, with a view toward reaching a consensus on the principal elements of it. Thus, the EC Commission began, in close cooperation with the competent
authorities of the Member States of the EEC, to examine
the most important economic and technical features of
the air transportation industry in the EEC.' 0 9 Apparently,
difficulties arose with the scope of the envisaged EEC secondary legislation. They included (1) the scope of the
regulation, (2) the effect of the prohibition on anti-competitive commercial practices, (3) the granting of exemption from the prohibition, and (4) the formulation of
appropriate procedural rules."10
The EC Commission, however, continued its efforts. In
the course of its work, the EC Commission exchanged
views and information with the individual Member States
of the EEC." t Indeed, it presented a questionnaire to the
competent authorities of the Member States of the EEC
concerning the various features of the operation of the air
transportation industry in the EEC. In response to the
questionnaire, the member States provided detailed information on the following subjects: (1) laws, regulations,
and administrative provisions governing economic competition in the air transportation industry and information
concerning their application and enforcement by the competent national bodies, courts, or tribunals; (2) the
number, economic size, field of activity, and services of
airlines established in the different Member States of the
EEC, covering both scheduled and non-scheduled flights;
(3) relations between the individual Member States of the
EEC, airlines, and the appropriate international organizations; (4) bilateral and multilateral air transportation
log
See EC

Commission's Fifth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 88, at

25.
IiO

Id.

II See EC Commission's Sixth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 108, at
21.
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agreements entered into by the individual Member States
of the EEC; (5) agreements for technical and economic
cooperation between the different airlines; and (6) rela12
tionships between the airlines and transport auxiliaries.
From the information provided by the questionnaires, it
became apparent that there was one problem which
needed to be confronted by the EC Commission if its
draft EEC secondary legislation was to be meaningful and
practicable." 3 The problem related to the fact that the air
transportation industry in the EEC possesses special characteristics or features and that, therefore, the contemplated draft of the EEC secondary legislation should allow
for them.' 14 As has already been noted, direct governmental intervention in the operation of the air transportation industry and its "natural" monopolistic character
have rendered it special. However, in analyzing the replies to its questionnaire, the EC Commission formed the
opinion that, in taking the special characteristics of the air
transportation industry in the EEC into account, it was
necessary to ensure that special characteristics would not
jeopardize the direct application
of the antitrust provit5
sions of the EEC Treaty."
During the first half of 1978, the EC Commission made
available to the competent governmental experts of the
Member States of the EEC a preliminary draft of the EEC
secondary legislation." 6 It is noteworthy that before making the draft available to the various national experts the
EC Commission sought to make sure that it had completed its examination of whether and to what extent certain forms of cooperation between airlines might be the
subject of a "block" exemption from EEC antitrust
Id. at 21-22.
Id.
114 Id.
"1 Id.
I6
See EC Commission's Seventh Report on Competition Policy, at 58 (Brussels-Luxembourg, Apr. 1978).
1'

I11
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prohibition.' 17
However, in the end the EC Commission formed the
opinion that pre-existing relationships between airlines in
the EEC were not to be tampered with. The EC Commision based its opinion on the then-existing structure of the
air transportation industry in the EEC' 8 and on the extent of governmental intervention in the determination of
air routes and fares.' 1 9 The EC Commission's investigations into the extent of actual intervention by the governments of the Member States of the EEC in the
determination of air fares, and particularly into the extent
to which the governments proposed air fares, 20 appear to
have rendered the EC Commission's opinion inevitable.
Indeed, the findings of the EC Commission made certain matters abundantly clear. First of all, it became apparent that most of the governments of the Member
States of the EEC formally controlled scheduled air services between their own countries and other countries in
the EEC.' 2 1 Second, it became clear that the same governments also controlled landing rights, organization of
scheduled air services, the allocation of scheduled routes
22
to air carriers, timetables, capacities, and air fares.
Third, the EC Commission found that bilateral air transportation agreements between individual Member States
of the EEC regulated the operation of twenty-seven of the
possible thirty-six links between the territories of the
Member States of the EEC. 23 Finally, it became clear to
Id. See also EC Commission's Eighth Report on Competition Policy, at 36
I"
(Brussels-Luxembourg, Apr. 1979).
" EC Commission's Eighth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 117, at
36-37.
d. at 37.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
,23
Id. One should note that the 17 bilateral agreements do not always state the
real content of the decisions reached. Instead, they tend to be supplemented by
confidential letters of understanding exchanged between the aeronautical authorities of the EEC Member States involved. Such confidential letters tend to interpret, specify or even modify the terms of the bilateral agreements. To a great
extent the confidential letters may relate to the creation of commercial pools or
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the EC Commission that air fares were established either
in accordance with the procedures embodied in bilateral
agreements between the individual Member States of the
EEC or in accordance with the procedures of the 1967 International Agreement on the Procedure for the
Estab124
lishment of Tariffs for Scheduled Air Services.
Apart from making its draft EEC secondary legislation
available to the Member States of the EEC, the EC Commission also conducted discussions with the Member
States on appropriate EEC measures for improving structural conditions in the field of air transportation in the
EEC. 2 5 Apparently, the objective of the EC Commission
was to ensure the establishment of a fair measure of commercial freedom to airlines operating scheduled air services in the EEC. 126 Commercial freedom, in turn, was
thought likely to enhance competitive economic and commercial conditions between the different airlines in the
EEC. 127 Obviously, the realization of such an objective
was expected in the long-term, rather than in the shortterm. This expectation results because of the economic
and political obstacles to effecting any marked structural
changes in the air transportation industry in the EEC.
In view of the direct and extensive governmental involvement in the operation of air transportation in the
EEC, it seems inadequate for the EC Commission to concentrate on the resolution of anti-competitive commercial
practices of the private sector of the industry. That is, it is
an inadequate response for the EC Commission to seek to
underline the need for creating such commercial pools. See Air Transport, supra
note 3, at 27-28.
124 EC Commisson's
Eighth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 117, at
37. Namely, this is the "International Agreement on the Procedure for the Establishment of Tariffs for Scheduled Air Services," signed by most of the Member
States of the EEC which belong to the European Civil Aviation Conference
(ECAC). Indeed, the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg are the only
EEC Member States which have failed to ratify this international agreement. Id.
at 37.
1' See id.
12-1Id.

127 Id. See also EC Commission's Ninth Report on Competition Policy, supra
note 108, at 23.
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control the anti-competitive commercial practices of individual airlines in the EEC under articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty without devoting attention to the need for
measures to control the practices of the governments of
the individual Member States of the EEC. To remedy the
inadequacy, the EC Commission needs recourse to the
regulatory provisions of the EEC Treaty which control the
restrictive business or commercial practices of public enterprises and enterprises to which individual Member
States of the EEC have granted special or exclusive
12
rights.
The provisions in article 90(1) of the EEC Treaty prohibit the Member States of the EEC from enacting or
maintaining the anti-competitive business or commercial
practices of publicly-controlled and state-endowed enterprises. 29 Consequently, state-owned or state-supported
airlines in the EEC, the commercial activities of which
tend to be restrictive of economic competition, are subject
to the enforcement of the antitrust provisions of the EEC
Treaty.
Indeed, the EC Commission has observed that article
90(1) is at least potentially useful in this context, stating:
The Commission does not exclude a priori that such a situation exists in air transport and that, as the sector concerned is one where, in the main, those undertakings
referred to in Article 90(1) [of the EEC Treaty] (public undertakings or undertakings to which Member States grant
special or exclusive rights) operate, action could be taken
against the Member States by means of article 90(3) [of
the EEC Treaty] for infringement of Articles 90(1), 85 and
86 [of the EEC Treaty]. 3
,28 These provisions are contained in article 90 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 8.
1'2
EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 90(1).
13o See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
23. See also EC Commission's Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, at 21
(Brussels-Luxembourg, Apr. 1976), where it is observed of particular anticompetitive commercial practices in the air transportation industry in the EEC:
"[c]urrent procedures might be caught by Article 90 of the (EEC) Treaty, in conjunction with Articles 85 and 86 (of the same Treaty), insofar as the Member
States of the EEC merely delegate responsibility for tariff fixing to airlines." Id.
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Recognizing the uncertainty of the application of the
provisions of article 90(1), the EC Commission stated that
"this hypothesis is being tested and no conclusion has yet
been reached; it is a complex legal question in view of the
significant implications of the hypothesis for other government measures connected with prices."'1'
On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that the
EEC Treaty also seeks to exempt from its antitrust provisions the restrictive business or commercial practices of
certain publicly-owned or publicly-supported enterprises. 32 In particular, practices of public enterprises entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a fiscal monopoly may
be exempted from the application of the antitrust legal
prohibition of the EEC Treaty.133 Although the EEC
Treaty provides that such enterprises generally should be
subject to the application of the antitrust law of the EEC,
they nonetheless may escape the legal sanctions if the application of an antitrust law to them would tend to "oblaw or in fact, of the particular
struct the performance, in
13 4
them."'
to
assigned
tasks
The exemption provisions of the EEC Treaty, however,
tend to be strictly construed by the EC Court. 135 Consequently, very few public enterprises are likely to avail
themselves of the exemption provisions in question.
Although public enterprises must make certain that the
development of trade is not affected to such an extent as
would be contrary to the interests of the EEC, 36 all the
foregoing EEC Treaty provisions are applicable to the re13 See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
23.
1.12 EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 90(2).

.3Id.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Belgische Radio en Televisie (BrT) v. Societe Beige des Auteurs,
Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) and N.V. Fonior, [1974] E.C.R. 313, [1974]
1.14

14 COMMON MKT. L.R. 238; Gerhard Zuchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank AG,
[1981] E.C.R. 2021, [1982] 33 COMMON MKT. L.R. 313.
'm, EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 90(2).
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strictive commercial activities of the various national airlines within the area of the European Common Market.
It was against the general background of the foregoing
factors that the EC Commission proceeded on August 10,
1981, to submit to the EC Council a proposal for the
adoption of an EEC secondary legislation for the application of the antitrust provisions of articles 85 and 86 of
EEC Treaty to control anti-competitive business or commercial activities in the air transportation industry in the
EEC. 13 7 It should be noted that the EC Commission's
proposal was debated in both the EC Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee of the EEC. 138 Indeed,
on June 18, 1982, the EC Parliament adopted a resolution
which approved, in principle, the proposal of the EC
Commission. 139
In addition, it cannot be overlooked that during 1982
all the Member States of the EEC were able to reply to the
questionnaires which the EC Commission had sent to
them in the previous year for the purpose of determining
more clearly the applicability of the antitrust provisions of
articles 85 and 86 to the tariff-setting procedure. 40 The
replies appear to be consistent with the EC Commission's
conclusions in its report on scheduled passenger air fares
in the EEC;. 4 l that is, evidently the fares tended to result
from airline and governmental actions. Predictably,
therefore, the first stages of consultation and negotiation
tended to involve the airlines - either individually or collectively - while the final responsibility for the adoption
of a tariff rested with the governments of the Member
States of the EEC. 142 In addition, the EC Commission re24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 4 (1981).
-1 See EC Commission's Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, at 31 (Brussels-Luxembourg, 1982).
137

131,25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 182) 120 (1982).
140

See EC Commission's Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 138,

at 32.
141

COM (81) 398 Final, para. 8, ofJuly 23, 1981.

See EC Commission's Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 138,
at 32.
14.
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ceived questionnaire replies from a number of airline
companies concerning its questionnaire with regard to the
inquiries into capacity and pooling arrangements and certain other matters in which decisions had intended to be
common ones. 43 Still, the EC Commission found that the
replies were rather incomplete in character, thus highlighting the need for appropriate EEC secondary legislative powers which enable the EC Commission to conduct
thorough investigations and impose effective sanctions.
IV.

ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE EEC SECONDARY

LEGISLATION PROPOSED BY THE EC COMMISSION

As proposed, the EC Commission's secondary legislation would regulate only the business or commercial operations of the airlines or air transportation companies in
the EEC. Consequently, it would not be concerned with
measures which are solely the responsibility of the Member States. Thus, business or commercial activities between the Member States would fall outside the purview
of the proposed EEC secondary legislation.' 44 In addition, state-imposed business or commercial conduct in the
air transportation industry in the EEC would fall outside
45
the scope of application of the secondary legislation.
As the EC Commission has stated, "[t]he object is to develop conditions giving more scope for competition than
at present in the business conduct upon which the companies themselves decide - where the State plays no
part."

A.

46

The Scope of Application of the Proposed EEC Secondary
Legislation

The proposed EEC secondary legislation prescribes
rules for the application of the antitrust provisions of arti143

Id.

See EC Commission's Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, supra note
130, at 20.
145 Id.
144

146

Id.
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cles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty for the regulation of
anti-competitive business or commercial activities in the
air transportation industry in the EEC.' 47 That is, the
proposed secondary legislation will regulate only the anticompetitive business or commercial activities of individual
airline companies or operators. In other words, similar activities by national governmental authorities in the Member States would not be controlled by the proposed EEC
secondary legislation. Therefore, the proposed EEC secondary legislation would "assist the application of [the
antitrust provisions of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty] mainly in those sectors of the air transportation
market where the airlines appear to possess such freedom
(i.e. charter services)." 48
The limited scope of the proposed EEC secondary legislation may detract from its efficacy. Thus, it is not surprising that the EC Parliament, in approving in principle
the EEC proposed secondary legislation, 49 found it necessary to express its reservations about its limited scope
and its lack of provisions relating to structural conditions
of the air transportation industry. 50 Conversely, the preamble to the proposed EEC secondary legislation does, in
very general terms, indicate that "the present Regulation
does not prejudge the application of Article 90 of the
[EEC] Treaty.""'' Implicit is the idea that the EC Commission might attempt to regulate the anti-competitive
business or commercial activities of the Member States
through the use of the antitrust provisions of the EEC
Treaty. Nonetheless this idea needs to be properly addressed rather than vaguely articulated by the preamble
of the secondary legislation.
147

Proposal for a Council Regulation Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC

Treaty to Air Transportation, art. 1(1), 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 291) 4 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as EEC Secondary Legislation].
,,,See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
22.
141,25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 182) 120 (1982).
I.'See EC Commission's Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 138,
at 31.
,., 24 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 291) 5 (1981).
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The EEC secondary legislation as proposed would be
applicable only to international air transportation.15 2 In
other words, the proposed EEC secondary legislation
would be inapplicable to air transportation activities of a
purely domestic nature. Arguably, domestic air transportation is unlikely to have an adverse impact on trade between the Member States, and that lack of substantial
negative impact may have led to the exclusion of domestic
air transportation from the proposed EEC secondary legislation. Furthermore, it seems to be inapplicable to international air transportation between Member States of
the EEC and non-EEC countries; presumably, this may be
true because this form of commerce is controllable or
regulable within the legal framework of IATA or the
ECAC. In addition, the proposed EEC secondary legislation excludes restrictive business or commercial practices
which result in the application of technical improvements
or in achieving technical cooperation from the prohibition
of the antitrust provisions of article 85(1) of the EEC
53
Treaty.t
Technical cooperation agreements may involve first,
the establishment or application of standards or types of
aircraft, equipment, supplies, or fixed installation. Second, they may involve the exchange, pooling, or joint
maintenance of aircraft, parts, equipment, or fixed installations and the exchange or pooling of personnel. Third,
they may involve the organization and execution of successive, complementary, substitute, or combined transport operations and the fixing and application of inclusive
rates and conditions for such operations. Fourth, they
may involve the coordination of timetables with the aim of
meeting the needs of passengers. Fifth, they may involve
the grouping of single consignments. Sixth, they may involve the establishment or the application of uniform
rules in relation to the structure of transportation tariffs
and their conditions of application; however, this would
.2
EEC Secondary Legislation, supra note 147, art. 1(2).
1-- EEC Secondary Legislation, supra note 147, art. 2.
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fall outside the scope of application of the proposed EEC
secondary legislation as long as the rules concerned do
not directly or indirectly fix transportation rates and conditions. Finally, they may involve the issue of tickets accepted by different airlines and the provisions of a
54
common refund scheme.'
B.

Power of the EC Commission Foreshadowed
For effective regulation of anti-competitive business or
commercial practices in the air transportation industry in
the EEC to be ensured, the EC Commission must be
vested with the appropriate legal and procedural powers.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the EC Parliament has
on several occasions found it essential to stress "the need
for a regulation to confer on the [EC] Commission the
powers of investigation and sanction necessary for a
proper application of [the antitrust provisions] of Articles
85 and 86 [of the EEC Treaty] to the [air transportation]
industry, 55 although such application should be gradual.' 56 The need for vesting the EC Commission with
the necessary legal and procedural powers constitutes the
raison d'etre of the proposed EEC secondary legislation.
The EC Commission itself has alluded to the secondary
legislation as being a "purely procedural Regulation
designed to give the [EC] Commission its own powers to
investigate and punish infringement, powers which it
' 57
lacks at present."'
Three main aspects of the powers proposed by the secondary legislation to be exercised by the EC Commission
are noteworthy. First, the EC Commission would be
IM

Id.

1 See, e.g., EEC Restrictions 16 (1980) (restrictions on economic competition
in the air transportation industry in the EEC).
15, See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
21.
157Id. at 22. See also EC Commission's Ninth Report on Competition Policy,
supra note 108, at 23 ("[a]s the matters stand the Commission has not sufficient
powers to apply the rules of competition systematically and effectively to airlines"); EC Commission's Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, supra note 130,
at 19-20.

1984]

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST

109

given the powers to investigate complaints against individual airline enterprises. It may exercise this power by
acting on a complaint submitted by Member States of the
'5
EEC or by persons who claim a "legitimate interest."' 1
The secondary legislation does not clearly state which individuals would be entitled to claim a "legitimate interest." Presumably, airline users and other airline
companies or operators would fall within the category of
eligible persons. However, a complaint made by a person
to the EC Commission may be rejected as unfounded if
the evidence suggests that there are no grounds for intervention either under the antitrust provisions of articles 85
or 86 of the EEC Treaty or under article 8 of the proposed EEC secondary legislation.'59 Alternatively, the EC
Commission may act on its own initiative to inquire into
and terminate any infringement on the part of individual
airline companies of the antitrust
provisions of articles 85
60
and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
For the purposes of exercising the commission's investigative powers, EC Commission officials would be able
to: (1) examine the books and other business records of
individual airline enterprises; (2) obtain copies or extracts
from the book and business records of such enterprises;
(3) ask for oral explanations of the records; and (4) enter
any premises, land, or vehicle of the enterprise.' 6 ' The
EC Commission may also obtain all necessary information
from the governments of the Member States of the EEC
and from their competent authorities, as well as from various business or commercial enterprises established in
their respective territories 62for the purpose of discharging
its functions and powers.
Moreover, the EC Commission may request the competent authorities of the Member States of the EEC to facili"5 EEC Secondary Legislation, supra note 147, art. 3.
-9 Id. art. 4(2).
Id. art. 4(3).
Id. art. 13(1).
,62 Id. art. 11(1).
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tate the conduct of appropriate investigations which the
EC Commission itself may have ordered. 63 It becomes
apparent, therefore, that the EC Commission must enlist
the co-operation of the competent authorities of the
Member States of the EEC in the discharge of its functions. This appears to have been fully recognized by the
EC Commission itself. Consequently, the proposed EEC
secondary legislation provides that the EC Commission
"shall carry out the procedures provided for in this Regulation in close and constant liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States [of the EEC]; [and] these
the right to express their views on
authorities shall have
64
such procedures." 1
The proposed EEC secondary legislation also seeks to
vest the EC Commission with power to impose fines 165 or
periodic penalty payments 66 on individual airline enterprises. With respect to the EC Commission's power of
imposing fines on individual airline enterprises, there
would be three main grounds on which it could be exercised. 16 7 These relate to: (1) where the airline enterprise
concerned supplies incorrect or misleading information
when applying for an exemption from the antitrust prohibition under article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty; (2) where
such companies supply incorrect information in response
to the EC Commission's inquiries into some sectors of the
air transportation industry in the EEC or in response to
the EC Commission's requests for other relevant information; or (3) where such companies provide incomplete
of antitrust
books or other business records in the6 course
8
investigations by the EC Commission.
Under the proposed secondary legislation the minimum
fine assessible by the EC Commission in any of the fore-, Id. art.
164Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
167 Id. art.
1- Id.

12.
8(1).
14.
15.

14(l).
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going situations would be 100 units of account, 69 and the
maximum limit would be 5,000 units of account. 170 Furthermore, the EC Commission would be able to impose
fines of from 1,000 to 1,000,000 units of account, or a
greater sum not exceeding ten percent of the turnover of
each of the companies participating in the infringement of
the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty in the preceding business year.' 7 ' In these circumstances, the companies concerned must have either intentionally or
negligently caused an infringement of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty. 72 In imposing fines, the EC
gravity and the duration
Commission should consider the
73
'
involved.
of the infringement
Periodic penalty payments would, on the other hand, be
imposed on airline companies for the purpose of compelling them to: (1) end a violation of the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty; (2) refrain from breaches of
conditions attached to an exemption granted by the EC
Commission; (3) supply complete and correct information
requested by the EC Commission during the conduct of
its antitrust investigations; or (4) submit to an antitrust
investigation ordered by the EC Commission.' 74 The
amount of periodic penalty payment may range from 50
to 1,000 units of account per day.' 75 This contrasts with
the payment of a fine which would occur once, rather than
on a daily basis.
The EC Commission's power to impose a fine or periodic penalty payment, however, is not an absolute one.
The EC Court would have unlimited jurisdiction 76 to review a decision of the EC Commission by which a fine or a
periodic penalty payment may have been imposed on an
1w,About 100 U.S. dollars.
17oAbout 5,000 U.S. dollars.
17, EEC Secondary Legislation, supra note 147, art. 14(2).
172 Id.
177

Id.

17'

Id. art. 15(1).

175
17,

Id.
EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at 75 art. 172.
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airline.177 In that respect, the EC Court would be able to
cancel, reduce, or increase any fine or perodic penalty
78
payment already imposed by the EC Commission.
It is evident that all the foregoing provisions of the proposed EEC secondary legislation are similar to those con7
tained in the principal EEC antitrust Regulation No. 17.1 1
In addition, however, the relevant provisions of the proposed EEC secondary legislation both elaborate and
render more precise the scope of the necessary EEC antitrust procedural rules and requirements. Obviously, the
jurisprudence developed by the EC Court and the EC
Commission thus far would provide a resource which
could be tapped when the proposed EEC secondary legislation is adopted and promulgated into EEC law by the
EC Council.
C. Foreshadowed Provisions Governing Applications For
Exemption from the Relevant EEC Antitrust Legal
Prohibition
It is apparent that some of the commercial agreements
which airline companies in the EEC enter into may be exempted from such legal prohibition under article 85(3) of
the EEC Treaty, despite appearances that they might be
subsumed with in the antitrust prohibition of article 85(1)
of the treaty. The EC Commission has recognized this exemption.180 Moreover, most of the national experts of the
Member States of the EEC advocate the granting of
"wide-ranging exemptions for scheduled air services in
regard to agreements on fares, capacity-sharing, and even
revenue." 181
EEC Secondary Legislation, supra note 147, art. 16.
Id.
119Moreover, as the EC Commission itself has pointed out, they also repeat the
provisions applicable to transport by rail, road, and inland waterway. See EC
Commission's Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, supra note 130, at 19-20.
'noEC Commission's Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, supra note 130, at
22.
i"' See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
-

178
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However, in view of the changing environment of the
air transportation industry in the EEC and the Commission's need to acquire practical experience, the EC Commission considers that "it would be ill-advised to embark
on granting exemptions for particular forms of agreements or practices."'' 82 In other words, the EC Commission considers the granting of block-exemptions, in such
circumstances, premature. 83 Consequently, the EC Commission considers it advisable to wait "until it has acquired sufficient experience by means of individual
decisions before contemplating such measures. "184
The provisions of the proposed EEC secondary legislation governing applications for exemption from the EEC
antitrust prohibition reflect the cautious attitude of the
EC Commission. Thus, applications for exemption
would be allowed by individual airline companies or operators on a case-by-case basis.' 8 5 In these circumstances,
the EC Commission would be duty-bound to publish a
summary of the application in the Official Journal of the
European Communities to invite all interested third par8 6
ties to submit their comments to it within 30 days.1
However, the EC Commission would be required to have
due regard to the need for protecting the legitimate interests and the
business secrets of airline companies or
8 7
operators. 1
For as long as the EC Commission fails to notify individual applicants within a period of 90 days of any serious
doubts as to their claim for exemption, that exemption
would be deemed to have been granted. 88 On the other
hand, an application for such an exemption would be
deemed to have been rejected once the EC Commission
182

Id.

183See EC Commission's Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, supra note

130, at 20.
184

Id.

185

EEC Secondary Legislation, supra note 147, art. 5.

186 Id.
187

Id.

188

Id.
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has duly notified individual applicants of its decision. 89
Should the EC Commission grant an exemption, it may
attach conditions and obligations to it.' 90 An exemption
would be renewable should the economic conditions for
applying the provisions of article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty
continue to be satisfied.' 9 ' Conversely, the EC Commission could revoke or amend the grant of an exemption or
prohibit specified acts by the airline companies or operators involved if the facts underlying the exemption change
or prove to be false, or if the parties breach any obligation
92
attached to its grant, or abuse the exemption.1
The exercise of the discretionary powers of the EC
Commission, in all the foregoing circumstances, would
not be absolute. The EC Court would have review powers
over the decisions of the EC Commission. 9 3 In other
words, individual airline companies or operators which
are aggrieved by decisions of the EC Commission would
be entitled to apply to the EC Court for review. It is difficult, however, to see how the EC Court would be able to
exercise its review powers in these circumstances unless
individual applications are also connected with an appeal
against a fine or perodic penalty payment imposed by the
EC Commission or with an appeal of a cease-and-desist
order issued by the Commission.
All of the foregoing provisions of the proposed EEC
secondary legislation spell out and clarify the evidentiary
and procedural rules for the granting of an exemption
from the antitrust prohibition under article 85(1) of the
EEC Treaty. In this regard, although the provisions concerned are similar to those of EEC antitrust Regulation
No. 17, they could be more specific in nature. No doubt,
the jurisprudence developed so far by the EC Court and
the EC Commission would be pressed into service when
89

Id.

Id. art. 6(1).
lot Id. art. 6(2).
92 Id. art. 6(3).
193 Id. art. 7(1).
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the proposed EEC secondary legislation comes to be
adopted and promulgated into EEC law by the EC
Council.
D.

Envisaged Provisions Relating to the Need for the Conduct
of General Inquiries

There have been a number of occasions on which economic and other factors have motivated airline companies
or operators to adopt various forms of restrictive business
or commercial practice. Recent developments in the air
transportation industry in the EEC and in other developed market-economy countries testify to that. As a result, there is a need for periodic inquiries into the
operations of the various sectors of the air transportation
industry in the EEC.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the proposed EEC secondary legislation seeks to vest the EC Commission with the
power of conducting general inquiries into the operations
of the various sectors of the air transportation industry in
the EEC. 94 The EC Commission would be able to exercise its power should trends in transportation, fluctuations in or inflexibility of transport rates, or other
circumstances, suggest that economic competition in air
transportation is being distorted or restricted within the
European Common Market.' 95 In these circumstances,
the EC Commission would be able to request transportation companies or operators to supply any necessary information and documentation for the purpose effecting
the antitrust provisions of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty. 196
Since airline companies or operators of a notable size
exert considerable economic and operational influence on
the air transportation industry, particular attention needs
to be paid them. Such airline companies or operators
often to have a great deal of impact on the level of eco194

Id. art. 10.

195

Id.

196

Id.
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nomic competition in the air transportation industry. In
view of this impact, the proposed EEC secondary legislation seeks to empower the EC Commission to request airline companies or operators whose size suggests that they
occupy a dominant position within the European Common Market to provide it with particulars of their structure and behavior as needed for an appraisal of their
position.
V.

GENERAL EVALUATION AND OVERVIEW

The EC Commission has described its proposed EEC
secondary legislation as "[fllexible enough to allow a
body of case-law to develop that reflects both the specific
problems of the [air transportation] sector which is characterized by the fact that most of the companies fall within
the scope of Article 90 of the [EEC] Treaty and that some
of their behaviour is imposed on them by their governments."' 97 However, the limited nature and scope of the
proposed EEC secondary legislation would only bring
about the regulation of a narrow area of anti-competitive
business or commercial practices in the air transportation
industry in the EEC.
Without subjecting the anti-competitive business or
commercial activities of government-owned or government-controlled airline enterprises to some form of effective and direct overall regulation, the proposed EEC
secondary legislation may have only a minimal effect in
terms of ensuring effective economic competition.' 98 The
EC Commission itself has stressed that competition in the
air transportation market, 99 including private airlines,
has given rise to fewer complaints as to the provisions of
the EEC Treaty than the competition among scheduled
air services stating: "[T]he competitive situation [among
197

23.

EC Commission's Ninth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 108, at

°s Cf Dagtoglou, supra note 86, at 352-55.
The complaints have been made by individual air transportation users and,
most recently, by the European Bureau of Consumer Unions.
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scheduled air services] has given rise to complaints 200 as
to its compatibility, particularly with regard to fares, with
the provisions of Articles 85, 86 and 90 (of the EEC
Treaty)."201
Consequently, the EC Commission's Memorandum
concerning an EEC Approach to Air Transport, 0 2 should
assume greater importance if effective business or commercial competition in the EEC's air transportation industry is to be ensured. However, this would depend on the
EC Commission adopting and giving legal effect to the
economic competition proposals contained in the
Memoradum of the EC Commission. 0 3 So far, this does
not appear to have materialized.
Moreover, there are some Member States of the EEC such as France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy - which oppose the idea of ensuring more economic
competition in the EEC air transportation industry.20 4 Indeed, the United Kingdom seems to be the only Member
State of the EEC which is highly in favour of deregulation
of the air transportation industry in the EEC.20 5 In effect,
therefore, "vested interests against deregulation . . . are
very strong.

' 20 6

Nevertheless, it appears that the EC

Commission has persuaded most of the Member States of
the EEC "to accept a first step towards the deregulation of
air fares within the [EEC]. 20 7 This acceptance is "some200 The private airlines, despite public disapproval, are apparently free of national governmental control or intervention.
201 See EC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 8, at
22.
211 See Air Transport, supra note 3.
2.1 Cf Dagtoglou, supra note 86, at 350.
204 See How About Larger Lorries and Cheaper Air Fares?, THE ECONOMIST, at 59
(June 4, 1982). See also Dagtoglou, supra note 86, at 339-40.

2w. Dagtoglou, supra note 86, at 339-40.

that these vested interests include
206 See id. at 340, where it is contended
"management and unions of the established, often overmanned, and, therefore,
not necessarily competitive airlines; national Governments concerned with the
well-being of their 'national flag carriers' and afraid of losses in currency inflow."
Together, they account for the opposition of most of the Member States of the
EEC to a deregulation of the air transportation industry in the EEC. Id.
217

See How About Larger Lorries and CheaperAir Fares?,supra note 204, at 63. Such

concessions by the other Member States of the EEC have been made in exchange
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thing the British Government has been battling for since
1977."208
Apparently encouraged by the move toward deregulation, the EC Commission has drafted EEC secondary legislation to break the national-airline monopoly for certain
flights within the EEC, excluding those that start or end at
major international airports. 20 9 This EEC secondary legislation would apply to flights from Manchester to Corfu
or from Antwerp to Cannes for example, subject to three
requirements. 21 0 The flights must be regularly scheduled,
the distance covered must exceed 400 kilometers, and the
capacity of the aircraft must not exceed 70 seats.21
Although this falls short of what the British Government
has been demanding, the view seems to be that "it would
be a step in the right direction. ' 2 1 2 However, the individual Member States of the EEC may lack the requisite
political will to ensure that the draft EEC secondary legislation is adopted and promulgated into EEC law by the
EC Council.
At present, the secondary legislation remains under examination by the EC Council's Ad Hoc Working Group
on Air Transport Rules of Competition.21 3 As the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group are merely preliminary and do not yet include an article-by-article review of
the proposal, 4 a rapid ratification by the EC Council is
unlikely. The slow progress of the EC Council should not,
however, be considered symptomatic of a predestined demise of the proposed EEC secondary legislation.
Public opinion in the EEC concerning the need for effective economic competition in the air transportation infor the British Government's being prepared to agree to accept continental Euro-

pean juggernaut lorries on British roads. Id.
208

Id.

210

Id. See also June in the EEC, THE ECONOMIST, 48, 58 (July 2-8, 1983).
See How About Larger Lorries and Cheaper Air Fares?, supra note 204, at 63.

211

Id.

212

Id.

21,

See EC Commission's Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 138,

2o

at 31.
214

Id.
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dustry cannot be easily ignored by the national
governments of the individual Member States of the
EEC.2 5 Traditional arguments advanced against the
opening of the air transportation industry to competition
are not particularly convincing. The need for aviation
safety and the international legal underpinnings of the air
transporation industry cannot impede the move to make
the air transportation industry economically competitive. 2 16 From the standpoint of economic efficiency, national governmental control of or intervention in the air
transportation industry cannot be justified. From the perspective of the users of air transportation, effective economic competition in the industry should lead to cheaper
air fares without sacrificing aviation safety and the utility
of the services provided. 7
This is another reason why the proposed EEC secondary legislation should be endorsed by the EC Council.
Although the EC Commission has suggested that the provisions of article 90 of the EEC Treaty might be invoked
to regulate aspects of the business to the commercial operation of the air transportation industry in the EEC
under individual national governmental control, this
should be expressly stated in the applicable secondary
legislation. However, a recent agreement to the adoption
of an EEC Directive for allowing modest economic competition in regional air services between the Member
States of the EEC by the Transport Ministers of the Members States 2 18 may be an important step in that direction.
At the same time, it cannot be taken for granted that
adoption and promulgation of the proposed EEC secondary legislation would ensure some form of effective economic competition in the air transportation industry in
the EEC. A great deal depends on how the EC Commission approaches its role and the seriousness and imparti215
216

7

2

218

Cf Dagtogiou, supra note 86, at 340-4 1.
Id.
Cf Free Trade in the Sky, supra note 10, at 14.
See June in the EEC, supra note 209, at 58.
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ality with which it exercises its legal functions and powers.
The EC Commission has frequently succumbed to political pressures from the individual national governments
of the Member States of the EEC when strict enforcement
of particular EEC laws has been at issue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, there is a need to render the air transportation industry in the EEC more economically competitive. National governmental ownership or control of most
of the operations of the air transportation industry in the
EEC creates unnecessary increases in costs and, therefore, militates against lower fares by the various airlines.
While the EEC antitrust authorities must be able to control or regulate national governmental practices in the
Member States, EEC antitrust authorities must also be
able to exercise direct control over the anti-competitive
business or commercial activities of private airline companies or operators in the EEC.
The proposed EEC secondary legislation addresses the
issue of EEC antitrust authority control; however, the legislation would not ensure effective economic competition
in the air transportation industry in the EEC. Yet, despite
its inadequacies, the proposed EEC secondary legislation
constitutes an important step in the right direction. The
EC Commission and EC Council should be strongly encouraged not only to adopt the secondary legislation, but
to ensure its consistent and effective application in the individual Member States of the EEC.
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